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FRED VINSON AND THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP* 
JoHN P. FRANKt 
ABLE, KINDLY FRED VINSON was a one-man multi-purpose project. 
Memory recalls few Americans with as many careers and as 
many successes. He was an influential Congressman, a lower 
court judge, head of a great lending agency, a Cabinet member, a friend 
and adviser of Presidents. Perhaps the pinnacle of his career, if not in 
prestige then in accomplishment, was his World War II service as head of 
the Offices of Economic Stabilization and of War Mobilization and Recon-
version. Many an eye-witness account of those years pays tribute to his 
shrewdness, his judgment, and his tact. 
He made, indeed, a more outstanding personal success in some of these 
other roles than he did as Chief Justice of the United States. On the 
Supreme Court, his record was more that of a team man than an outstand-
ing individual figure. To borrow a phrase from the baseball he loved so 
well, his individual attainments as a jurist do not put him in the same 
league with such lofty eminents as Marshall, Taney, Waite, Taft, Hughes, 
or Stone. His place in judicial history rather will be based upon his role as 
· a member of a group which together turned the course of American juris-
prudence, and will gain its color from his engaging personal qualities. 
This essay will record impressions of his individual accomplishments, 
his views, and his part in the general movements of the seven years of his 
service as thirteenth Chief Justice of the United States. 
I. THE OPINIONS AND THEIR QuALITIES 
Chief Justice Vinson used his power of assigning opinions generously. 
Indeed, he shared the plums with so lavish a hand that sometimes a whole 
year might go by without his having reserved anything of real significance 
*This article is the seventh in an annual series on the work of the Supreme Court in the 
preceding term. The death of Chief Justice Vinson, whose service on the Bench began with the 
first term reported in this series, makes it desirable to broaden the scope of this year's article 
to review some aspects of his Supreme Court career. In order at the sal)le time to continue 
the annual series, wherever possible examples have been taken from the 1952 term decisions, 
and the tabular data which have previ()usly been included in these articles are incorporated 
here. The term itself was substantively light, the postponement of the school segregation 
cases (discussed in the text above) putting off the major business of the year; hence concentra-
tion of this article on the late Chief Justice is not at the expense of much significant detail on 
other matters. The earlier articles are at 15, 16, 17, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1947-50); 19 ibid. 
165 (1951); 20 ibid. 1 (1951). 
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University. 
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for himself. As a result, the number of Vinson majority opinions of any 
profound public consequence can be counted on one hand. In the field of 
freedom of speech, Douds and Dennis; in the field of race relations, the 
Restrictive Covenant Cases and Sweatt v. Painter; these and the Lewis 
Case are about it. To these must be added the steel seizure dissent and, 
arguably, one or two other majority opinions.l The number is sufficiently 
manageable to permit each to be mentioned here, although each has al-
ready been reviewed so extensively that comment can be brief. 
a) Race relations.-S!zelley 'II. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (The Restric-
tive Covenant Cases), and Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). The first 
held racial restrictive covenants unenforcible, in equity, and the second 
invalidated segregation at the University of Texas law school in terms 
broad enough to reach graduate education generally. These are first class 
opinions, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases, particularly, involved 
great complexities; of course each contains points which someone eh:e 
might have handled differently, but this only -highlights the attention to 
considerations of strategy which may account for the manner of execution 
of details.2 The Restrictive Covenant Cases identify the problem fairly, 
analyze the authorities thoughtfully, get into the fundamental reasons for 
the decision, and are presented in good, clear, lawyer's prose. The Texas 
law school case does not go nearly as far as many, including this writer, 
hoped it would, 3 but the analysis of the factors that made the law school 
which was open to Negroes "substantially unequal" gets to the funda-
mentals in a remarkably concise way.4 
1 Each of the cases mentioned in this paragraph is fully identiJied in the immediately sub-
sequent paragraphs. One other noteworthy opinion in the majority is Oyama v. California, 
332 U.S. 633 (1948), invalidating at least some restrictions on land sales in California to per-
sons of Japanese descent or Japanese aliens. Other salient, though less significant, opinions are 
discussed in the text, infra. 
2 For example, Shelley v. Kraemer "distinguished" rather than overruled Corrigan v. 
Buckley, 271 U.S. 323,331 (1926), despite the fact that at the page cited, the Court in Corrigan 
brushed aside the identical argument accepted in Shelley v. Kraemer; Corrigan had subse-
quently been accepted as a ruling on this point, and certiorari had been denied. See, e.g., Mays 
v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869 (App. D.C., 1945), cert. den. 325 U.S. 868, 896 (1945). No one can 
know whether the Chief Justice accepted the distinction or merely thought it tactful to 
make one. 
; See Brief of Law Teachers in the Sweatt case, 34Minn. L. Rev. 289 (1950), which urged 
invalidation of the whole system of segregation. 
4 The opinion reduced the differences between the two schools to two fact-filled paragraphs, 
concluding: "The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes from its 
student body members of the racial groups which number 85% of the population of the State 
and include most of the lawyers, ·witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom peti-
tioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas bar. With !:uch a 
substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the education 
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b) Free speech.-American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 
382 (1950), and Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The first 
upheld the non-Communist oath requirement of the Taft-Hartley Act,5 
and the second held valid the SmithAct.6 These two are not equal in their 
execution. Dennis, assuming its point of view, is a g~lOd opinion; in Douds, 
Vinson's usual clarity is wanting. 
Contemporary society has been ingenious in adding to the classic fine 
and imprisonment new ways of preventing objectionable political conduct 
and opinion. One of those novel devices was utilized in the Taft-Hartley 
Act, which conditions access of unions to the National Labor Relations 
Board upon the filing of oaths by union officers that they are not affiliated 
with the Communist Party and that they neither "believe in" nor are 
members of any organization "that believes in" the overthrow of the 
government. 
Three members of the Court, for whom the Chief Justice spoke, upheld 
the Act in both its membership and its belief provisions. Justice Black 
dissented altogether, and Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dissented as 
to the beliefs. A central problem in the case is the extent to which an 
economic sanction-here the loss of a union position-should be subject 
to the same standards of appraisal under the First Amendment as would 
a more conventional criminal sanction. To put it another way, how rele-
vant is the First Amendment to a statute imposing a "merely" econo-
mic sanction? 
The Chief Justice posed this great question more clearly than he an-
swered it. His thought process is seen by putting text excerpts in parallel 
columns, with emphasis added: 
offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the 
University of Texas Law School." 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950). 
The Restrictive Covenant Cases were so widely reviewed that it would be invidious to 
select particular articles for citation. Suffice it to say that a review of 25 of them reveals an 
almost total absence of criticism of Vinson's technical handling of the case. For laudatory com-
ments see Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 
203, 214 (1949); and (with a little criticism interspersed), Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real 
Estate, 24 Notre Dame Lawyer 157 (1948). Typical law review response to Sweatt v. Painter 
(none of which was critical of Vinson's execution of the case) was that he had, with cautious 
political judgment, gone about as far as he could in the particular case and at the same time 
had undermined segregation practices for further assaults. See case notes, 36 Va. L. Rev. 797, 
800 (1950), 30 B.U. L. Rev. 565, 568 {1950). · 
6 54 Stat. 670-71 (1940), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (1951). Justices Douglas, Clark, and Minton 
did not participate in the American Communications case. 
1 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (Supp., 1951). 
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[.\iter analogizing to valid conditions on 
holding bank director::hips] lj no tn<Jre 
u:ere irr.:O::ed tJt.1n possible luss of position, 
the f·Jregoing would dEpose of the ca...<e. 
But ..• Congress has undeniably <fu-
couraged the lawful expression of political 
ireedoms a.s well .... Men who hold 
union offices often have little choice but 
to renounce Communi.sm or give up their 
offices .... To the grave and difficult 
problem thus presented we must nov; 
turn our attention. Pp. 392-93. 
[The Act~ leaves those few who are ai-
fected iree to maintain their a.rllliations 
and beliei.s suhjec! only to possible wss uf 
positions which Congress has concluded 
are being abused .... P. 404. 
[T]o attack the straw man of '·thought 
control" is to ignore the fact that the sole 
effect oj the stutule upon one who believes 
in overthrow oi the Government ••. is 
that k may be jorced to relinquish Iris posi-
tion as a union leader. P. 408. 
In other words, by the Chief JU5tice's own statement of the problem, 
the issue is whether an act is valid in which nwre "than possible loss of 
position is involved/' and the answer is that the Act is valid because 01zly 
a possible loss of position is involved.' 
The opinion discusses more fully than it illuminates the "clear and 
present danger'' test, which, as treated here, reduces to a judicial duty of 
"weighing the probable effects of the statute upon the free exercise of the 
right of speech and assembly against the congressional determination that 
political strikes are evils of conduct ... and that Communists ... pose 
continuing threats to that public interest when in positions of union lead-
ership."8 In making this balance, the opinion scrupulously goes no further 
than the immediate situation demanded, and it has subsequently been 
interpreted very narrowly to mean no more than that the government 
could condition access to the benefits of its own administrative agency, the 
Labor Board, upon making the required showing.9 How far the govern-
ment may go in imposing such conditions is unclear from Douds, which 
declares only that there are limits; once that practice is begun the scope of 
these limits is necessarily so obscured that perhaps no more could be ex-
pected. 
In other words, Chief }U5tice Yinson decided the Dauds case without 
attempting to create an intellectual standard for the future. In Dennis he 
attempted to supply that intellectual standard. Here was no question of a 
novel sanction: the issue was whether the defendant Communist leaders 
'Cf. Judge Learned Hand on Justice Cardozo: "He never disguised the difficulties, as lazy 
judges do who win the game by sweeping all the chessmen off the table .... " 48 Yale L. J. 
379, 380 (1939). 
I 339 t:'.S. 382, 400 (1950]. 
1 Kedrofi >. St. ~1cholas Cathedral, 3-14 t:.S. 9l (1952 •. 
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could be imprisoned for allegedly conspiring to overthrow the government 
at some undefined but distant future time. 
In Dennis, Vinson struggled to bring his balancing approach, seen in the 
Douds quote above, into the Holmes-Brandeis tradition. This attempt to 
bring old prophets to the support of the new faith stands at about the 
margin between technical success and failure. Few of the commentators 
are persuaded that there is really much resemblance between the Holmes-
Brandeis position (which was in fact brilliantly expounded by Justice 
Douglas in his Dennis dissent) and the Vinson doctrine.10 Indeed, Vinson 
himself did not long adhere to the masquerade; their doctrines are :finally 
put aside with the words, "Justices Holmes and Brandeis were ... not 
confronted with any situation comparable to the instant one."11 We thus 
get a transformed clear and present danger rule which, as phrased by 
Judge Learned Hand and adopted by Vinson, makes the issue "whether 
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such 
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."12 The balanc-
ing of interests thus contemplated is to be rested on judicial notice and a 
presumption of legislative validity; it does not require facts in th~ record 
to establish just what the "gravity of the evil" is. 
Dennis clearly is the founding ground of an almost awesomely sig-
nificant new era in American jurisprudence; it is in terms of practical con-
sequences probably the most important opinion of Chief Justice Vinson.J3 
10 The commentators, whether in favor of the Dennis result or cirtical of it, all agree that 
Vinson very materially has changed the clear and present danger test; as Antieau puts it, he 
substitutes a ''perhaps and probable" test, Dennis v. United States, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 141 
(1952). Notes which recognize the Vinson opinion as a change in the law are: 40 Geo. L. J. 304 
(1952); 50 Mich. 451 (1952); 36 Minn. 96 (1951); 31 B. U. L. Rev. 544 (1951). For analysis of 
the "transmutation of the clear and present danger test" in the various Dennis opinions, see 
Rostow, Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 217 et seq. (1952). 
11 341 u.s. 494, 510 (1951). 1% Ibid. 
13 Dennis was the only case cited to sustain the proposition that the First Amendment does 
not protect an alien against deportation for having been a member of the Communist Party. 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952). See Comment 20 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 547, 
553 (1953). And although not specifically referred to it has been the key decision in a number 
of recent cases limiting the protection of the Amendment to "subversives": e.g., Garner v. Los 
Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (upholding validity of non-Communist affidavit for 
municipal employees); Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding constitu-
tionality of New York's Feinberg Law, making ineligible for public employment all members of 
organizations which "advocate the overthrow of the government ..•. "). 
The decision itself, upholding the validity of the Smith Act, was the signal for other prose-
cutions under the Act throughout the country. The Supreme Court at the 1952 Term refused to 
review the convictions obtained in the first of these to come before them, Frankfeld v. U.S., 
344 U.S. 922 (1953), Justices Black and Douglas dissenting. The validity of similar state laws 
was left in doubt, the Supreme Court vacating the judgment of a district court which had up-
held the Michigan Communist Control Bill, ordering postponement until the state courts had 
construed it. Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953), Justices Black and Douglas dissenting. 
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c) Industrial crisis.-The two most colorful Vinson opinions, particu-
larly in terms of the momentary excitement from which they emerged, 
involved government seizure of private property to control industrial dis-
putes. One was United Mine JV orkers v. United States, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) 
(the Lewis case), arising from the government's operation of the coal 
mines; the other was the recent steel seizure case, Youngstown Sheet&-
Tube Co. 'D. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
There is nothing fresh to be said on either of these well worn topics, but 
a word may be offered on the two Vinson opinions from the standpoint of 
style and execution. What the two cases have most in common is that each 
involves a situation in which any conscientious and patriotic judge might 
feel the situation so necessitous that he would plunge toward a result re-
gardless of what the prior law may have been. 
United Mine Workers v. United States, in particular, is one of those 
block-buster opinions which smashes its way to its result. To "get Lewis" 
and to break the coal strike it was necessary to hold either (a) that the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act was inapplicable to government-seized properties; 
or (b) that Lewis was obligated to obey the temporary injunction even 
though the court which issued it had no jurisdiction. It is doubtful that 
many lawyers would have thought that either of these propositions was 
the law three months before this episode arose, but, to paraphrase a pas-
sage in another Vinson opinion, "they are the law today .1114 The Chief Jus-
tice embraced both positions in an opinion which is creative (necessarily), 
forceful, and thoroughly well presented. It is in an intellectual sense a 
brutal opinion, because the opposing precedents are simply ignored, the 
writer not bothering either to distinguish or overrule them;15 but when a 
result is being reached from the necessities of the situation rather than 
from the doctrine of the cases, this is perhaps as good a way to do it as 
any.IG 
Vinson's dissent in the steel seizure case is perhaps his strongest single 
opinion. It is, again, an opinion of necessity, or of what the Chief Justice 
uSee discussion of United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952), p. 220 infra. A leading 
analysis of the precedents is Cox, The Void Order and the Duty To Obey, 16 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 
86, 109 (1948): "Whatever may be said about the historical basis of the doctrine of the non-
frivolous order, the decision in the Mine Workers case has given that doctrine a stature that it 
has not heretofore possessed." And see note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 811, 813 (1947), on the readily 
distinguishable nature of the Chief Justice's one precedent. 
uSee particularly the cases collected by Mr. Justice Rutledge in his dissenting opinion to 
which the Chief Justice makes no reference. 
11 If, of course, the emergency warrants that result. Justice Murphy, dissenting, took anoth-
er view: "[T]hose factors do not permit the conversion of the judicial process into a weapon for 
misapplying statutes according to the gravt> eTieende.~ of the moment." 
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conceived the necessity to be; but it offers a real, large-scale exposition of 
the emergency powers of the President. In the steel seizure dissent, Vinson 
chose the device of claiming for the President far more power than was 
needed for the case at hand, so that the particular power claimed therein 
should a fortiori be within those of the executive. An alternative strategy 
might have been to take much narrower groundp and in every other im-
portant Vinson opinion except these two seizure cases, he took narrow 
ground when it was available. That he should have departed so far from 
his own accepted practice in these two cases is some indic~tion of the emo-
tional intensity with which he must have regarded them. 
d) The 1952-53 Term. -concentration on a few outstanding cases may 
give a mistaken emphasis to the picture of a role of a member of the Court 
which can be balanced by brief consideration of a typical year's contribu-
tion. The 1952-53 Term is a fair sample of Vinson's work, since his opin-
ions were somewhat more significant in some years, less in others. Out of 
104 opinions of the Court, Vinson wrote 11.18 Six involved extremely nar-
row points, points so minute that they will interest only a small fragment 
of the Bar, much less the general public. These were whether a particular 
state court opinion should be remanded for clarification before Supreme 
Court review; whether a Court of Appeals opinion had been appealed 
within the ninety days permitted by statute; what the (rare) en bane pro-
·cedure of the Courts of Appeals should be; whether a particular unusual 
tax loss should be assigned to one year or another; which state's Statute of 
Limitation applies to wrongful death actions brought in Federal Court 
outside the state of the accident; whether a state court might enjoin the 
bringing of a Federal Employees' Liability Act suit in another state, a 
point which will have practical consequence in a minority of the states.19 
n The case is discussed in some detail in the 1951 Term article, pp. 3--17, with particular 
reference to this exact point at 15-16. Since no one doubts that the government can, one way 
or another, take possession of industrial property in war time, the precise issue narrowly 
considered is whether Congress has the eminent domain power exclusively, or whether, in 
some limited circumstances, this power is shared by the Executive. To quote the 1951 Term 
article, p. 15, Vmson's "argument blends together every brave act or daring contemplation of 
past Presidents, without regard to any particular relation to eminent domain. George Washing-
ton quashed the Whiskey Rebellion and proclaimed neutrality in the Napoleonic Wars. The 
Louisiana Purchase, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the breaking of the Pullman Strike 
are all recounted, and so is the defense of Iceland by President Roosevelt." 
18 The figures above are based on the .same counting method used throughout this series. 
Included are only cases which were argued, and which were decided with an opinion of greater 
substantiality than a mere order with citations. Excluded are simple companion cases. 
19 The cases alluded to, in order, are: Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952); Fed. Trade 
Comm. v. Minneapolis Honeywell Co., 344 U.S. 206 (1952); the Western Pacific Railroad Case, 
345 U.S. 247 (1953); Healy v. Comm'r Int. Rev., 345 U.S. 278 (1953); Wells v. Simonds 
Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); Pope v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 345 U.S. 579 (1953). 
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A seventh case involved a somewhat larger question, but with an answer 
so obvious that everything worth saying could be and was said in a few 
paragraph:;: it was not difficult to hold invalid a system of selecting juries 
in which the names of prospective jurors went into the jury box on cards 
colored in accordance l\ith the race of the jurors.20 
Those seven cases gave no opportunity for judicial greatness-it is 
doubtful if a Holmes could have made anything out of such ingredients, 
and certainly Vinson did not. Any broadly important personal written 
work must necessarily lie in the four remaining opinions, or in dissent.21 
Two, while scarcely earthshaking, were of more than passing sig-
nificance. One of them, United States~- Reynolds,22 raises an intriguing, if 
most unusual, question: what shall be done when the government is sued 
for negligence-in this case resulting from a plane crash-and the plaintiff 
in the course of pre-trial discovery attempts to probe into what the gov-
ernment regards as a military secret? An Air Force regulation. under an 
appropriate statute. forbade disclosure of the papers in question without 
the approval of the Secretary of the Air Force, who would not give it; and 
the District Court thereupon issued an or_der under Federal Rule 37 that 
the facts as to negligence should be taken as established in favor of the 
plaintiff. The precise matter for decision was the extent to which a district 
judge should satisfy himself that information which the military claimed 
as secret really was secret, and was not merely over-classified_; and the 
ChiefJustice dealt with the question in a well-presented, thoughtful, com-
prehensive manner. After full analysis of the precedents and guiding prin-
ciples, he concluded that the necessity of secrecy far outweighed any 
benefit to the plaintiffs on the particular facts. 
Second of these lesser cases was United States v.l\'ugent.23 Conscientious 
objectors are entitled under the Selective Service Act to a "hearing" before 
the Department of Justice after "appropriate inquiry" by the Depart-
ment. usually undertaken by the F.B.I. The issue was whether this right 
to a hearing includes the right to know the content of the F.B.I. reports 
~ :\\·ery v. Georgia, 345 t'".S. 559 (1953). 
n \<1nson's dissents were most infrequent, in part because, as is shown below, he was almost 
always in the majority on significant matters. and in part because, one may suspect, he disap-
proved of insubstantial dissents. At the 1952 Term he did dissent with opinion in Brock v. 
Xorth Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953), and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), discussed in 
the text p. 236 infra. The first of these cases involved a difficult double jeopardy point, and the 
second a very basic issue concerning the scope of Vmson's own Restrictive Covenant opinions. 
The dissents are weU presented, and very probably occupied more of Vinson's time than any of 
the seven minor majority cases mentioned abo\·e nith the possible exception of the en bane 
case, Western Pac. R. Corp.\'. Western Pac. R. Co., 345 U.S. 24i (1953). 
• 22 345 t'".S. 1 (1953). !l 346 U.S. 1 (1953). 
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and particularly the identity of unfavorable witnesses. Palpably a person 
does not, for normal purposes, receive a fair hearing if he does not know 
what the charges against him are nor what the evidence is; nonetheless the 
Chief Justice held that the need of expeditious disposition of conscientious 
objector cases is such that the normal safeguards might be by-passed 
under the Act and that this procedure did not violate the Fifth Amend-
ment. If the holding permitted such a flimsy hearing for administrative 
purposes generally, this would indeed be a body blow to due process; but 
the Chief Justice was careful to limit it to the peculiar circumstances of 
Selective Service, and it presumably has no application in other fields. 
The two major Vinson opinions of the year, in terms of broad-gauge 
significance, are United States v. Caltex, Inc. and Burns v. Wilson, both 
involving basic issues of government powers and responsibilities in war-
time.24 
Caltex arose from the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Two 
weeks after Pearl Harbor, as it became apparent that the Japanese would 
occupy the Islands, an appropriate Army engineer notified American pe-
troleum companies around Manila that their property was "requisi-
tioned." Within a few hours of the time at which the property would have 
fallen into Japanese hands, American soldiers demolished it to keep the 
Japanese from getting it. This action was unquestionably wise; the sole 
problem was· whether the government must pay for plants which it had 
destroyed. Whether the property would have been destroyed later by the 
Japanese, or would have been injured in the course of reoccupation, is of 
course purely speculative. 
Whether the United States must pay for the property of its citizens 
which it destroys in a scorched-earth withdrawal from its own territory is 
a great issue. Vinson's decision, that the Fifth Amendment does not com-
pel the government to pay, may have vast significance to the mainland 
United States if ever we are invaded. The conclusion, in the opinion of this 
writer, is sound; but no one is likely to say that the opinion represents the 
process of Supreme Court adjudication at its best. 
In general structure, the opinion is concise almost to the danger point of 
seeming off-hand. After the facts, it is six paragraphs, or less than several 
of the opinions on the narrow points mentioned earlier. Indeed, it is short 
enough to permit a paragraph by paragraph synopsis. The first paragraph 
identifies the two main dicta thought to require payment;25 the second 
u 344 U.S. 149 (1952), and 346 U.S. 137 (1953). 
25 Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. (U.S.) 115 (1852); United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 
(U.S.) 623 (1871). 
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paragraph quotes the one dictum against payment;26 and paragraph three 
cites a somewhat tangential case as accepting the dictum that payment 
was unnecessaryY .-\ssuming the latter passage to be in point, the authori-
ties are balanced. with two dicta on each side. 
\\"e are thus left with three paragraphs to tell which line is to be fol-
lowed. The fust of these states the result: "[\\lhether or not the principle 
laid down [in one of the non-payment cases} was dictum when ... enunci-
ated ... it is law today." The next paragraph reverts to the facts leading 
to the unanswerable climax which neither side controverted: the prop-
erty "was destroyed that the l""nited States might better and sooner de-
stroy the enemy." 
With one paragraph to go, the reader knows only that this property was 
destroyed in the interest of the general welfare of the l""nited States, and 
that the .\merican citizen who owned the property must bear the full loss. 
The last paragraph merely restates the conclusion. 
When the Army destroys the property of some of us for the benefit of all 
of us, there ought to be some identifiable reason why we should not all 
share the loss. The decision might be on the basis of clear.authority; here 
that possibility is unavailable, since the authorities are all dicta and quite 
at odds.28 A second possibility might be logic, which is barely attempted 
211 United States v. Pac. R. Co., 120 lJ.S. 22i (1887). The issue in this case was whether the 
railroad had to pay the go\·emment for four bridges built by the go\·emment on the railroad's 
property, but not at the railroad's request. The four bridges replaced bridges which had been 
destroyed in the Ch;I War, two of them ha\;ng been destroyed by each side. The actual 
holding was that the railroad was not liable for bridges built on its property by the govemmen t 
for the government's om1 purposes. 
27 Vmson's treatment of the relation of these two cases is so remarkable as to be worth a 
word of detail. In Caltex, he quotes five sentences from Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227 (188i), 
and then, a moment later, says: ".\nd what was said in the Pacific Railroad case was later 
made the basis for the holding in Juragua Iron Co. v. l.'nikd Stales, 212 U.S. 29i (1909) •••• " 
344 U.S. 149, lSi (1952). He does not point out that the five sentence passage he extracted 
from Pacific Railroad is not the passage quoted in Juragua Iron; rather a quite different passage 
was used. 212 I;.S. 297. 30i (1909). This "as almost inevitable, since Juragua involved the un-
related situation of destruction of property in an enemy country (Cubal. 
u In its sixth footnote, the opinion·mentions a few cases on related problems. There is a 
considerable body of authority on practice in connection '1\;th the War of 1812, where there 
were several instances of destruction or taking of property to keep it out of enemy hands. with 
which the Court does not seem to have been acquainted by counsel. See on 1812 experience, 
American State Papers, Class IX, Claims Xo. 243, p. 424 (whiskey and gunpowder owned by 
traders destroyed to prevent capture by hostile Indians who had surrounded the fort of 
Chicago); No. 258, p. 441 (rope~ and considerable quantity of finished rope destro}·ed at 
Baltimore upon approach of British during War of 1812); Xo. 266, p. 446 (small house in 
Alexandria used as storehouse destroyed when stores were destroyed to prevent their·capture 
by the British in War of 1812). Indemnification was permitted in the latter two cases; in the 
first it was refused on the ground that speculation was the reason for the presence of the stores. 
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here; John Marshall might have done it that way.29 A third possibility is 
the way of Chief Justice Stone; the circumstances might be analyzed for 
practical reasons of social policy which require this result. It may be-this 
writer suspects that it is-so expensive to pay the cost of such a retreat as 
that of the Russians in World War II from Kiev to Stalingrad that the 
attempt should not be made for fear of breaking the country's war efiec-
tiveness. Barring that circumstance, what reason is there why a man 
should not be paid who contributes his bit to the common good? But if .the 
late Chief Justice had any such notion of social policy underlying his 
decision, there is no hint of it here. 
The final Vinson opinion of 1952-53 was Burns v. Wilson, 30 on the scope 
of civil court review of military justice proceedings. In terms of sheer 
quantity, the volume of military criminal cases is the largest body of 
criminal cases under one jurisdiction in America. In 1945, there were 
730,000 trials by courts martial, and the peacetime average is anticipated 
to be about 280,000. The whole volume of criminal cases in th~ state of 
New York for a year is about 207,000, and the federal criminal business at 
its peak was about 37,500 cases. 31 
· It follows that any basic decision on the extent that federal courts will 
review these hundreds of thousands of courts martial is of the most 
prodigious importance. Burns v. Wilson was such a case. Petitioners had 
been conviCted by courts martial for murder and rape, and had been sen-
tenced to death. They petitioned for habeas corpus in an appropriate dis-
trict court, alleging that they had been illegally detained, convicted on 
coerced confessions, and were denied counsel as well as other constitu-
tional rights. The opinion of the Chief Justice held that the district court 
had jurisdiction to insure that constitutional rights were protected by the 
military courts, but only to the limited extent of determining that the 
various questions raised had been honestly considered by the military 
courts of review. The district court itself could not review the merits of the 
29 The only attempt at argument by logical parallel is the one sentence assertion that if the 
army had relinquished the property to the Japanese and then destroyed it, there would have 
been no recovery. 
ao 346 U.S. 137 (1953). The opinion was not accepted by a majority of the Court, Justice 
Jackson concurring in the result without opinion, and Justice Minton taking the more extreme 
position that the federal courts have no function in review of the decisions of military courts 
once the jurisdiction of the latter has"been established. Justices Black and Douglas dissented 
and Justice Frankfurter believed that there had been insufficient time to consider the record 
adequately for decision. 
at The figures are taken from Karlen and Pepper's illuminating Scope of Military Justice, 
43 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 285 (1952). 
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constitutional claim of petitioners once it was established that those merits 
had been reviewed by the military. 
Without reference to its conclusion (v.ith which this writer does not 
agree), Burns.,_ WilsotJ is a good opinion. Complete originality was not 
called for since this case is fourth of a series, 32 but it illuminates the earlier 
cases and gives clear grounds drawn from practice and tradition for its 
result. It is, from the standpoints of clarity and persuasive use of mate-
rials, the best, as well as probably the most important, opinion of the 
Chief Justice for the year. 
These were the majority opinions of Fred Vinson for a year: eleven 
opinions, seven minor, two of some importance, and two of considerable 
importance.33 Of the latter two, the war demolition case will achieve sub-
stantial significance if, in some future war, our forces withdraw in our own 
territory, destro)ing as they go. The other, the court martial case, will 
have a large effect on work-a-day American life. as long as substantial 
numbers of citizens are in the armed forces. 34 
~For general principles. Hiatt v. Brown. 339 t'.S. 103 (195/lJ; and for more immediate ap-
plication, Gusik v. Schilder, 340 t'.S. 128 (1950J; Whelchel Y. ~IcDonald, J:W t'.S. 122 (1950). 
u The Chief Justice was also the author of an opinion, in which three justices joined. result-
ing in the disbarment from practice before the Supreme Court of one of the attorneys in the 
Dennis case, who had been comicted for contempt in his conduct of the trial. In re Isserman. 
3-l5 t'.S. 286 (1953). lsserman had been disbarred in his home state oi Xew Jersey and under 
the Supreme Court's practice was required to show cause why he should not be disbarred by it 
also. It takes a majority vote to show cause; Justice Clark disqualified himself, hence the 'iew 
of Vmson and his colleagues prevailed over that of Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justices 
Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas. Here again, the Chief Justice decides against the indi\·idual. 
oat of fear for the safety of an institution: "There is no vested right in an indi\idual to practice 
law. Rather there is a right in the Court to protect iL<:elf, and hence society, as an instrument 
of justice." Yet the precise nature of the danger is never revealed. '•[W)e do not lay down a rule 
of disbarment for mere contempt; rather we have considered the basic nature of the actions 
which were contemptuous and their relationship to the functioning of the judiciary .... " Xo 
more is said on the point. Justice Jackson, on the other hand, who had also written the Su-
preme Court opinion upholding the contempt conviction, shows that previously contempt 
per se was not sufficient for disbarment, that no conspiracy to obstruct justice was shown and 
Isserman's conduct before the Supreme Court has been unexceptionable. 
u This was a light load compared \\ith that of his predecessors in their last full years on the 
Court. In his final complete term Chief Justice Stone wrote seventeen majority opinions. :\t 
least eight of his majority opinions and dissents, each \\ ith great sl.ill in its execution. "ere of 
considerable significance. 
~Iajor Stone opinions \\ere Steele v. Louis\ille & X. Ry .. 323 t'.S. 192 (1944•. a basic case 
on race discrimination in labor unions; Special Equipment Co. \·. Coe. 324 t".S. 3;0 Cl945), 
non-user does not \itiate a patent; Georgia\·. Pennsylvania R. Co .. 324 t'.S. 439, 468, dissent, 
in which Georgia attempted to improve its freight rate situation; Hoo\·en & Allison Co. v. 
Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, the leading modem case on the original package doctrine; Com Products 
Ref. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 32-! t".S. i26, a key ca.<:e on basing points and the Clayton 
Act; Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. ~IcAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945), a significant case on stand-
ing to raise constitutional questions; Southern Pac. R. Co. , ... -\.rizona, 325 t".S. i61, perhaps 
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Perhaps the most striking personality quality of Vinson's opinions is 
their odd lack of personality. Chief Justice Marshall functioned without 
law clerks; Hughes had one; Stone began the era in which a Chief Justice 
had two. Chief Justice Vinson had three law clerks, an administrative as-
sistant, and a little staff of secretaries and messengers. This gave him an 
opportunity to be somewhat more of a supervisor than an immediate par-
ticipant in the detail work of his office. Yet judicial personality is largely a 
matter of details; the Holmes epigram, the Black way with facts, the 
Frankfurter vocabulary, the Brandeis footnote, the Stone pragmatism 
cropping up in unexpected places. 
The result is that the experienced reader can spot many of the opinions 
of the Justices just mentioned without knowing their author. With Vinson 
this was rarely true. There is, instead, an unevenness of quality in Vinson, 
some of his good opinions being excellent and some of the others being a 
far cry from it, sometimes in prose and frequently in legal detail. 35 Ob-
viously any Justice has his range; Vinson's was unusually wide. Most of 
his opinions are, so far as impression of a personality is concerned, simply 
indistinct. 
One distinct intellectual trait was an inclination, doubtless borrowed 
from his great success as a conciliator in Congress and in administrative 
Stone's leading opinion on state regulations of commerce; and Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 
135, 166 (1945), dissent, on review of alien deportation orders. 
Chief Justice Hughes, in his last year, was slowing down-he was seventy-nine-but some 
four or five of his opinions were on big themes and each had the impress of his personality: 
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940), a leading case on the weight to be given 
subordinate state court decisions under the Erie rule; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 
(1941), a major limitation on rights of street use by religious groups; Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 
U.S. 69 (1941), on rights of a seaboard state to control fishing in adjacent waters in view of 
federal and international law; and Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941), a landmark 
case on racial discrimination by interstate railroads. A case of less general interest that year, 
but still of some real consequence, was Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940}, 
holding that employers subject to backpay awards should be given the benefit, in the compu-
tation, of amounts received by the employee on work relief. 
36 The best opinions are described or listed at various points in this article. One opinion 
which caused the Chief Justice a belated headache was United States v. Alcea Band, 329 U.S. 
40 (1946), which held that an Indian tribe was entitled to judgment for a taking by the United 
States, not on "moral" but on "legal" grounds. What those grounds were was left unspecified, 
but the clear implication of the citations was that this was a just compensation claim under the 
Ftfth Amendment, there being no other imaginable legal basis. (For details, see 1950 Term 
article, at 220.) But if the basis was just compensation, the Indians were entitled to interest, 
which the Indians duly claimed. The case thus returned to the Court, four years after the first 
decision, on the interest issue; the Court in a brief per curiam, 341 U.S. 48 (1951), refused the 
interest, denied that the first case had rested on the Fifth Amendment, and saved face by 
avoiding identification of what it had rested on. It is quite possible that no one knew what the 
basis of the earlier opinion was. The 1950 Term article, 220-21, quoted extensively from 
Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), as a sample of the kind of prose which happily was 
rare in Vinson as it is in most Supreme Court opinions. 
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duties, to go MOfmil his difficulties when he did not need to face them 
squarely. His opinions are full of exceedingly neat distinctions or of dis-
position of precedents with a silent treatment. 36 Yet on those rare occa-
sions when he felt that a precedent must be overruled, he was willing to do 
so.r. 
Vmson's strongest asset was, in most cases, comprehensive, succinct 
precision. Almost by definition, these are qualities which, because imper-
sonal, are not an individual "trademark" in the craft. It is something like 
the best law review note style, and yet is better; for the Vmson opinions 
were never cluttered with surplus erudition, and they have a clarity in 
result that almost always lets the reader know just where he is. He made 
something of an art of his opinions on minor subjects; they are of a sort 
most gratifying to the bar. Appended in the note is a list of fine samples.35 
ll. THE VIEWS OJ!' THE Clm:J!' Jt:STICE 
Earlier, this essay listed the four major opinions of the Chief Justice in 
his last year, and the half dozen major opinions of his Supreme Court 
career. The two race relations cases~ that group of ten must be separated. 
for on this subject Vmson clearly had a distinct philosophy. The most 
striking aspect of the other eight is that, although they have nothing else 
in common, all support the state as against the individual. Be it an evi-
dence case, an eminent domain case, a civil rights case or an industrial 
crisis case, in the Vmson view, the government won. 
This is not by remotest implication to suggest that Vinson was wanting 
in independent views. He was a man of integrity and conviction. But his 
convictions lay along a certain line; given a choice between the individ-
ual's freedom and what he honestly felt to be the needs of the state, '\-mson 
put the needs of the state first. Therein lay his concept of patriotism. Of 
course almost any honest judge puts the needs of the state ahead of the 
• See for examples the discussion of the Restricth·e Covenant and ~is cases, supra, and 
the treatment of precedents in Dennis v. t"nited States, supra; and see 19-!i Term article, p. -18. 
aTWilliamsv. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, Mi et. seq. (194i), by Vinson, a bankruptcy jurisdic-
tionc:ue,ovemdedBardesv. Hawarden Bank, liS U.S. 524 (1900). andSchumacherv. Beeler, 
293 U.S. 367 (1934); and Vmson joined in the explicit overruling oi Trupiano\". United States, 
334 U.S. 699 (1948), by t"nited States v. Rabinowitz, 339 'C".S. 56 (1950). In a larger sense, the 
very essence of his Supreme Court career was one gigantic overruling; ior his largest signi:i-
cance, as is developed below, is his part in the new departure from the chi! liberties moorings 
of the Constitntion prior to his accession. This change became a revolution with the deaths of 
Justices Mwphy and Rutledge; about 20% of the cases at the 1949 Term came to results op-
pollite to what they would have been if those Justices had lived. (See the 19-!9 Term article.) 
• Alma Motor Co. v. Tunken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 t".S. 129 (1946); Ex parte Collett, 33i 
U.S. 55 (1~); United States v. Aetna Casualty Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949); Bus Employees v. 
W'JSCOD!in Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951); t;'nited States v. Hayman, 3-12 t:'.S. 205 (1952). l!any 
others could be listed. 
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rights of the individual when the public welfare imperatively demands it. 
The difficulty arises in determining where that point of necessity is. Vin-
son had what might be described as a low threshold of crisis surprising in 
so generally affable and unexcitable a man. He saw full-blown emergencies 
where someone else might have thought there were only shadows; when-
ever the government sent out the fire engines, Vinson saw a fire. Hence he 
was very quick to sacrifice the individual right to the common good. 
Is it entirely coincidence that twice in Vinson's short career the Court 
took the extraordinary step of advancing a case to hearing without the 
review of the Court of Appeals, 39 and that in addition he personally called 
a special term to hear the Rosenberg matter? Would another Chief Justice 
not have desired to let at least two of those matters take their normal 
course? This writer, agreeing on the merits that the Supreme Court should 
not, after deliberation, have reversed the· Court of Appeals, is utterly 
unable to comprehend why the Rosenbergs had to be whisked into the 
electric chair to meet a Department of Justice timetable.40 Normal proce-
dure would have closed that case in the fall of 1953; it is hard to identify 
the "emergency" which required the electrical switch to be thrown weeks 
before the Chief Justice could get out his opinion explaining the legality of 
the execution. Any justification for the refusal to allow the doubtful mem-
bers of the Court time even to look into the disputed point must rest on 
the political ground that Communists were using the case for agitation. 
But it is hard business to take lives in haste because our enemies annoy 
us, and we have surely not improved the world's impression of our institu-
tions by an agitated last minute rush to execute the defendants before we 
can even say why. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter forcefully stated: 
Painful as it is, I.am bound to say that circumstances precluded what to me are 
indispensable conditions for solid judicial judgment .... It is almost mathematically 
demonstrable that there just was not time within twelve waking hours to dig out, to 
assess, to assemble, and to formulate the meaning of [the significant] legislative mate-
39 The Lewis and steel seizure cases, supra. A collection of cases on this use of the certiorari 
power, Robertson and Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 235 n. 2 (Wolfson and 
Kurland edition, 1951), reports only one case taken up in this fashion because of emergency 
circumstances between 1937 and the Lewis case; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (treason 
conviction): 
40 The Rosenbergs were sentenced AprilS, 1951; affirmed, 195 F. 2d 583 (C.A. 2d, Feb. 25, 
1952);rehearingdenied, 195 F. 2d 609 (April 8, 1952);cert. den., 344 U.S. 838 (1952); reh. den., 
344 U.S. 889 (1952); motion to vacate sentence denied, 108 F. Supp. 798 (S.D. N.Y., Dec. 10, 
1952); affd., 200 F. 2d 666 (C.A. 2d, Dec. 31, 1952); motion for reduction of death sentence 
denied, 109 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. N.Y., Jan. 2, 1953); cert. den. on motion to vacate sentence, 
345 U.S. 965 (May 25, 1953); (stay of execution vacated at same time); application for stay of 
execution to Mr. Justice Jackson, June 12, 1953, referred to full Court by him, denied 345 
U.S. 989 (June 15, 1953); pet. for rehearing denied as to May 25th certiorari, 345 U.S. 1003 
(June 15, 1953); motion for leave for original writ of habeas corpus denied, 346 U.S. 271 (June 
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rials. ••• Keither counsel nor the Court, in the time available were able to go below 
the surface of the question raised by the application for a stay which Mr. Justice 
Douglas granted .... We have not had in this Ca.se carefully prepared argument. We 
have not had what cannot exist without that essential primary. We have not had the 
basis for reaching conclusions and for supporting them in opinions. Can it be said that 
there was time to go through the process by which cases are aJStomarily decided 
here? ••• 41 
Over and over again ,-mson faced the question of whether a particular 
crisis required suppression of individual rights. His is the expression of 
that issue in terms of "weighing'' the freedom against the ''public interest., 
of some counter course. In Douds he accepted the Congressional judgment 
that the menace of political striltes required the oath device as a control. 
In Dennis, with no facts in the record, he accepted the imminence of the 
domestic Communist menace as against Justice Douglas' outspoken dis-
senting Yiew: "It is safe to say ... that the invisible army of petitioners 
is the best known. the most beset, and the least thriving of any fifth col-
umn in history. Only those held by fear or panic could think otherwLc:e.··.u 
It was this willingness to accept what might be called "emergency by 
assertion" that led to the Chief Justice's famous steel seizure dissent. The 
Chief Justice resolved the issue in favor of the power ohhe President to 
15, 1953}; stay granted by :\Ir. Justice Douglas, June 1i, 1953, reported 346 U.S. (appendix to 
Douglas opinion on main Rosenberg case}; stay ~-acated, 346 U.S. 273 Uune 19, 1953); execu· 
tioo, June 19, 1953. 
« 346 U.S. 273, 301 at 303 et seq. (1953}. 
Humanitarian impn1ses, stimulated in part by Oxnmunist politics led to intense inter-
national interest. particularly in France, see X.Y. Tunes, p. 15 Unne 17, 1953). The :\Ian-
chester Guardian editorial urging reprieve on political and humanitarian grounds, June Ii, 
1953, p. 6, cooclnded: "The interest of communism would be served by their execntion. That is 
a good reason for countermanding it." The ad\·erse publicity created by the case was aug-
mented by the .\merican press, whose sadistic and detailed coverage of the execution gaye the 
effect of a national hook-up to the episode, and could hardly make it more palatable: "Rosen-
berg's chest bulged straining against the straps. His fists clenched in tight knots. His neck and 
shoulders turned crimson. There were three massive charges of electricity ••.. He was dead in 
2! minutes.'' Sinillar t~eatment. for whate1.·er reason, did not quite killl!rs. Rosenberg, and 
it had to be dot:e o\·er again. :\Ieanwhile the ten and six year old children oi the spies were 
under press obsen-ation at the home of friends. At the critical moment, the ten year old boy 
cried out. "That's it. That's it. Goodby. Goodby.'' lfean"'hile the younger child was planning 
a card for Father's Day, which was that weekend. Phoenix, .\rizona, Gazette, p. 1 fJune 20, 
1953}. 
The .\merican press was not without criticism of the incident, and in particular the Supreme 
Court's role therein. In a lengthy editorial aiter the execution the St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
1n0te: ".-\second lesson is that a case of such gra~it)· and so adaptable for propaganda distor-
tion by Communists around the world should be handled by the Supreme Court surely and 
without undue delay. There should be no such confusing and undignified, last-minute judicial 
scramble as that which became part of the history of the Supreme Court last week. The stand-
ing of a case and the courts which handle it all suffer when an adjudication so hasty occurs.'' 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, § 2, p. 2b, col. 2 (june 21, 1953). 
ct3U U.S. 494, 589 (1951). 
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take the steel properties despite his absence of statutory authority or, in 
some views, despite the statutory prohibition. His opinion rings with 
phrases indicative of the underlying structure of his thought. Thus in his 
last two pages: "gravity of the emergency ... avert disaster ... preserve 
legislative programs from destruction ... immediacy of the threatened 
disaster ... the disastrous effects that any stoppage in steel production 
would have."43 In the year that has followed the steel decision, there is 
TABLE 1 
DISTRmUTION OF VOTES IN NON-l:J:NANIMOUS 
CIVil. RIGHTS CASES, 1952 TERMH 
IN BEHALF or IN DENIAL or 
CI.AIKED RIGHT CLADaD RIGBT 
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent 
~~n ........... 5 25 15 75 
Black ............ 18 95 1 5 
Reed ............. 4 21 15 79 
Frankfurter ....... 15 75 5 25 
Douglas .......... 17 85 3 15 
Jackson ........... 4 22 14 78 
Burton ........... 6 30 14 70 
Clark ............. 5 25 15 75 
Minton ........... 4 20 16 80 
little appearance that the event will bear out these lugubrious predictions; 
one wonders whether some of the other "emergencies" which seemed to 
the Chief Justice to require strong action would ever have come to the 
point of disaster, had the Court shown greater concern for the rights of the 
individual rather than fear for the safety of the state. 
a) Civil rights.-Perhaps because of his sense of the needs of govern-
ment, the Chief Justice almost never decided a difficult civil liberties case 
in favor of the individual. Where there was sufficient room for reasonable 
difference of opinion to permit the Court to divide, Vinson voted against 
the claimed right. Since during his Chief Justiceship, most debatable civil 
rights wer~ decided against the individual by the Court, his position in 
this respect was not notably different from that of the majority of his 
colleagues. 
43 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 709 (1952). 
•• The proper use and the limitations on this data have been discussed in each preceding 
article. In a capsulated way, the figures identify polar views, and help to suggest the degree to 
which a given Justice believes that a civil liberty value in a case should or should not control its 
decision. Any Justice who almost invariably votes for or against the claimed right must be 
putting either a very high or a very low value on civil liberty generally; nothing else could push 
him to the ends of the scale in this fashion, particularly in such a heterogeneous mixture of 
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TABLE 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF Von:s IN NON-UNA., ..UlOUS Clvu. 
RIGHTS CAsEs DU1UNG VniSOX CHIEF 
JusncESHIP-1946-53u 
' i Ix B.EII.U.F OJ' Ix DEJ1LU. OJ' 
I CLWim Rlcltt CLWa:D Jbcay 
I Xw.hct l Pet Caat 1 X umber l Per Cent 
Vmson ...... ........ ! 21 ! 17 106 I 83 
Black •••..••.•.• ·I 102 81 24 I 19 
Reed ••••••....•• ·: 21 17 106 i 83 
Frankfurter ....... t 72 57 55 43 
Douglas •••.•.•... t 96 83 19 11 
Jackson ........... 1 34 27 90 73 
Burton. . . . . . . . . . . 33 26 95 74 
Clark ............. r 14 25 41 75 
Minton ........... ' 9 13 58 87 
229 
ases. Those Justices more or less in the middle-Justice Frankfurter for example--are,pre-
!51UI1abl:y allowing other ,-aJues, unrelated to civil liberties as such, to have a greater weight in 
the dccisicos than their colleagues.. 
The twenty a.ses (disqualifications give some Justices lt:$) included in this year's table are: 
M.mdoli v .. Achesao, 344 U.S. 133; Kedroff v. St.. :\lcbolas Cathedral, 34-lu..s. 94; Dixon ,._ 
Daffy, 344 U.S. 143; Schwartz ,.._ Texas, 344 U.S. 199; Edelman ,-. California, 3M t:'.S. 35i; 
Brock v. North Carolina. 344 t:.S. 424; United States ex rei. Stnith v. Baldi, 344 t:'.S. 561; 
BI'D'Irn v. AJieu. 344 U.S. 443; Chew v. Colding, 3M U.S. 590; United States v. Kabriger, 345 
U.S. 22; Orloff v. ~by, 3!5 U.S. 83; .-\lbertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242; Heillila v. 
Barber, 3tS U.S. 229; SbalWmessy v. United States ex rei. Mezei, 3!5 U.S. 206; Poulos v. X ew 
JbmpsbR, 345 U.S. 395; Teny v. Adams, 3!5 C".S. 461; 'United States v. Xugent, 346 U.S. 1; 
Bauows v. Jacboo. 346 U.S. 249; Bnms v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137; Stein v. Xew York, 346 
U..S.156. 
Unanimous civil rights cases were: Vt"ieman v. t:'pdegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); United 
States v. Rumely, 3tS U.S. 41 (1953}; Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Avery,._ 
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953}; and District of Columbia ..... Thompson, 346 t:'.S. 100 (1953), aU 
holding in favor of the claimed right.. 
u Data for the preceding years is taken from the articles on earlier terms. Since Justices 
Clark and Minton served only the last four of the years of the Vmson Chief Justiceship, their 
participations are many fewer than the others. Justices l!tuphy and Rutledge, who served 
11ith Vmson for his first three years, for those years bad the following record: 
XOX-UX.:\..'I;D!Ot"S Cl\"ll. RIGHTS 
C.-\SES, 1946-48 TEIUfS 
Ix B£JLUJ' OJ' Ix DDaAL OJ' 
CLW<ED Ru:aT CLWO:D :lbcBT 
: I 
I I ,.---,,.-----
1 Swaber Per Cent ; Xumber I Per Cent 
-----------,·-----
Vmson ...•....... l 8 14 49 86 
Marphy .......•.. 1 53 95 3 s 
Rutledge ......... , 52 !i3 4 1 
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Notable instances of Vinson opinions restrictive of civil rights have been 
mentioned. Since he wrote comparatively rarely, his greatest influence 
was necessarily his vote; suffice it to say generally that he cast his vote in 
favor of restricting freedom of speech, increasing the breadth of searches 
and seizures, decreasing the freedom from forced confessions, and main-
taining the limits on the right to counsel. Necessarily in so doing, he fre-
quently helped to reverse the trend of the law. 
A salient example of this role as a participant in a shift in legal develop-
ment is found in Stein v. New York, 46 decided on the last regular decision 
day of Vinson's service. Like so many of the confession cases, this one 
involved detention incommunicado without charges, during which time 
the defendants were interrogated by the police. As is common as a result 
of this practice, the defendants contended and the police denied that bru-
tality was used; after the interrogation, one defendant had a broken rib 
and various bruises, another had many bruises all over his body, and a 
third had one bruise, but there was police evidence that these bruises could 
have been sustained prior to the arrest. Two of the three defendants con-
fessed, and their confessions were self-confirming in the sense that they 
could scarcely have known what they were confessing unless they were 
indeed guilty. 
The confessions were given to the jury, and the issue was whether this 
· constituted a denial of due process. The Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Jackson in which the Chief Justice joined, affirmed the convictions. Some 
years ago Justice Jackson as a dissenter had argued that self-confirming 
confessions, even if coerced, should be viewed a little less distastefully 
than others47 despite the then more conventional view that the object of 
excluding forced confessions was not only because they were inherently 
untruthful but also because police brutality is too ugly to be encouraged 
even if it works.48 In the Stein case the self-confirming quality of the con-
fession became a major element in the Court's approval of it.49 
45 346 u.s. 156 (1953). 
47 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57, 60 (1949), "[O]nce a confession is obtained it supplies 
ways of verifying its trustworthiness." 
48 For analysis of the philosophy underlying objection to forced confession, see Chambers 
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-39 (1940), and see 240-41: "The Constitution proscribes such 
lawless means i"espective of the end." (Emphasis added.) 
49 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 168 (1953) (statement of facts emphasizes accuracy of 
Stein';; confession), and 185. At the latter page, the subject under discussion is whether the 
confessions were psychologically coerced, and the controlling evidence to the contrary, in the 
Court's eyes, is achieved by accepting the confessions as true: "The inward consciousness of 
having committed a murder and a robbery and of being confronted with evidence of guilt which 
they could neither deny nor explain seems enough to account for the confessions here." 
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Essentially the Court held that it was within the discretion of the jury 
to conclude that the confessions were not coerced. But the verdict was 
general: there is no way of knowing whether the jury did so conclude or 
whether it concluded that the confessions were coerced, but that this was 
harmless since there was other evidence to convict. Justice Jack..."<>n there-
upon held the conviction good ef!e1J if I~ confessions were forced. Every 
previous case on the subject-Justice Jackson himseH listed fo~-b.as 
said that the admission of a coerced confession requires a new trial. Justice 
Jackson dismissed these as "dicta about a proposition not es..c:ential to the 
result," holding in substance that a jury with a forced confession in its 
hands is still free to convict despite the fact that its judgment has been 
corroded by the most poisonous possible evidence. Justices Black, Frank-
furter, and Douglas dissented. and it can only be regretted that Chief 
Justice rmson did not share this conclusion of Justice Frankfurter: 
It i~ pa:.:1ful to be compelled to say that the Court is taking a retro~.sive step in 
the admir:~tration of criminal ju:;tice .... By its change of direction the Court affords 
new inducement to r:olice and prosecutors to employ the third degree, whose use the 
Wicker::ham Commission found "widespread·· more than thirty years ago and which it 
UIL.;:;paringly condemned as "conduct ... violati\·e of the fundamental principles oi 
constitutional liberty." ... a 
H in all of the conventional fields of civil liberty, the Chief Justice was 
prepared to tum back the clock on indi'\idual rights, it was not surprising 
that in the new civil liberties matters, where there were fewer precedents 
to thrust aside, his ,;ews were almost l009C on the side of the state. He 
upheld loyalty oaths,~! approved the use of the _-\.ttomey General's list of 
subversive organizations,.H and had no objection to the increasingly severe 
treatment of aliens.~ _-\. recent instance of the alien ca..o:es, noteworthy 
principally becau..c:e to some at least it conveys the most brutal shock to 
'-1 Ibid •• at 189. The ca..ces .,..ere: ~Ialbski \".~e.... York, 32-l u.S. 401 (1945j; Lyons,._ Okla-
homa, 322 'C".S. 596 '194-l;; Sttoble v. Calliornia, 3-13 t:".S. 181 (1952J; Gallegos v. ~ebraska, 
3-12 t:".S. 55 (1951). 
i1 3-16 cs. 156, 201-2 (1953 '· 
u E.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works . .H1 t:".S. 116 (1951); American Communications 
.\ssociation ,-.Douds, 339 'C.S. 382 (1950•; but d. Wieman,._ t:"pdegraff. 34-l 1:".5. 183 (19.521, 
to the effect that such oaths may be in:pr.!5<:d concerning aiii.liation '1\"ith organizations only 
when there i:; scienter. 
u Joint .-\nti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 3-11 t'".S. 123, 18i (1951), joining in 
di=t by Ju.:tice Reed. 
~See. e.~ .. Knauff v. Shaughnessy. 338 t:".S. 53i (19.50) (exclusion of ....ar bride at un-
limited .£.<cretion .,[ .-\ttorney General•; Hari!;iades v. Shaughnessy. 3-12 t'".S. 580 (19.52' fde-
ponation oi alien who had been Communist as a young man more than a decade beiore act 
was passed caking this a grom::O: for depryrt:iti•:m ; C;;rlzon v. London. 342 t:".S. 524 1 1952· 
(aliens held without bail at dL<cretion oi Attorney General ii charged with Communism . 
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the moral sense of any of the opinions in this tragedy-laden area, is the 
case of Mezei, the famous Flying Dutchman or Wandering Jew depending 
upon the mythology from which one draws his analogies.66 The case has 
special symbolic import for purposes of this essay because it exemplifies 
the basic "Vinson team" at work; the majority consisted of the four 
Truman appointees (Vmson, Burton, Minton, and Clark) plus their fre-
quent fifth, Justice Reed. 
Mezei was born in Gibraltar of Hungarian or Rumanian parents and 
came to the United States in 1923. In 1948 he left his home in Buffalo to 
visit his dying mother in Rumania. He got to Hungary, where the Red 
authorities would neither let him go on or come back, but obtained an 
exit visa and returned to the United States in February, 1950. He was held 
at Ellis Island without charges, and finally was ordered excluded by the 
Attorney General, without hearing, on the "basis of information of a con-
fidential nature." He was put back on a boat, and twice crossed the ocean; 
but he had no place to go. The Red countries would not have him, and the 
Western European and Latin American countries, apparently intimidated 
by our unidentified fears, would not let him land. The legal issue was 
whether the Attorney General has the power to condemn a returning alien 
who has lived in the United States for 25 years to stay at Ellis Island or to 
wander the seas for the rest of his life, and this without any hearing and 
without any identification of the charges against him. 
By five to four, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Clark in 
which Chief Justice Vinson concurred, held that the Attorney General did 
have this power. Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson dis-
sented, and a few words from Justice Jackson's eloquent dissent will show 
their attitude: 
This man, who seems to have led a life of unrelieved insignificance, must have been 
astonished to find himself suddenly putting the Government of the United States in 
such fear that it was afraid to tell him why it was afraid of him .••• Since we pro-
claimed him a Hercules who might pull down the pillars of our temple, we should not 
be surprised if peoples less prosperous, less strongly established, and less stable feared 
to take him off our timorous hands .... [He should have] a fair hearing with fair notice 
of the charges. It is inconceivable to me that this measure of simple justice and fair 
dealing would menace the security of the country. No one can make me believe that 
we are that far gone. 56 
56 Shaughnessy v. United States ei rei. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
51 Ibid., at 219 et seq. As of April 30th, 1953, Mezei bad made application to twenty-five 
countries for entry, but was still at Ellis Island. The Attorney General was studying the case. 
N.Y. Times, p. 19 (April 30th, 1953). While the cause of the Government's action is necessarily 
a mystery, it is supposed that the reason may be Mezei's association with an insurance society 
which is on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. Mezei was connected with a 
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In two significant cases Vmson himself was the author of restrictive 
interpretatioD5 of the Bill of Rights which were not called for by the 
precedents. These were Ha"is 't'. [~ nited States,~• a search and seizure ca..c:e, 
and Feiner t-. X~.c York/'8 a free speech problem. Hams. in particular. 
came as a surprise to the bar, the commentators, and the press. The issue 
was the '\-alidity of a search, in Harris' apartment in the course of an arrest 
on a valid warrant for forgery, but without a search warrant, in which the 
FBI ransacked the defendant's apartment for five hours, allegedly looking 
for checks. They found nothing connected with the alleged forgery, but in 
a bedroom drawer they did find a sealed envelope which, after being 
opened without any legal authority, turned out to contain selective sen;ce 
documents to which the defendant had no right. He was charged with 
possession of those documents, and the issue was whether the search 
which obtained them was illegal. 
Prior to the Ha"is case. the law had been quite clear that a search inci-
dent to a valid arrest could only extend to visible or readily accessible 
e\;dence.~9 This was no technicality. but rather a sound judgment of pol-
icy. On the one hand. the law would be a fool if it could arrest the murderer 
and be compelled to leave behind the murder weapon on the floor at his 
feet; on the other hand, if in a society like ours in which there are my-riad 
plausible grounds for arrest, the police need only mention one and then 
can mmmage through a hou..::e seeking what they may find. privacy has 
borne a dreadful blow. In Ha"is. the Chief Justice upheld the Yalidity of 
the seizure. 
Clearly the HaTris case troubled the Chief Justice (or at least troubled 
someone in the five man majority for whom he spoke) becau..::e the opinion 
is as narrow as it can be on those facts. Stressed particularly was the fact 
that the police were searching for instruments related to the forgery. 
which might well haYe been present. and that the actual objects taken 
were illegally pos..c:essed by the defendants. Yet for all the qualifications, 
local workmen's benefit society long before it was absorbed by the offending or;acizati'Jni 
thereaiter he was for a time head of the Buffalo branch of the society. X. Y. Tlii!es. p. 1 • .\pril 
23, 1953). This is the same orpnization -.rlllch was held in International Workers Order \". 
:YcGrath. reporud. Sllb nom. Joint.\nti-Fascist Re~ Co!II.Icittee v. ~IcGrath. 3U CS. 123 
(1951), to be entitled to a trial, -.rlllch it has ne1o·er had, on the issue oi wbet.i.er it "~<"as uniairly 
listed. :Yezei is thus doubly damned; he is condemned to a Jiie sentence on Ellis Island, "Without 
notice O£ hearing conceming the nature of his affiliation "~<"ith an organization "Which itseU had 
been proscribed without fair notice and bearing! 
IT 331 tr.S. 14.5 fl9!i,. "3ro t".~. 315 119.51 . 
"~Iarron v. t"nited States. 2i5 t".S. 192 (192i), a5 limited in Go-Bart Importing Co. \". 
l'"nited States, 282 l".S. 3-14 (1931). and t"ni;:ed States\". Lefk'Jwitz. 2~5 t".S. 452 (1932 . 
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the opinion is subject to the observation made by Justice Frankfurter in 
dissent: 
One's views regarding circumstances like those here presented ultimately depend 
upon one's understanding of the history and the function of the Fourth Amendment. 
A decision may tum on whether one gives that Amendment a place second to none in 
the Bill of Rights, or considers it on the whole a kind of nuisance, a serious impediment 
in the war against crime. so 
The whole course of the Vinson participation in Fourth Amendment cases 
places him intellectually in the category last described by Justice Frank-
furter.61 
The second restrictive civil rights opinion, Feiner v. New York, was a 
curious episode .. It involved the classic problem of whether, when speech is 
otherwise legal but is offensive to some of its auditors, the police should 
arrest the speaker or, instead, should attempt to control those in the 
crowd who would disrupt the speech.62 Feiner was giving a street comer 
speech for Wallace; his text was in poor taste but whether it was incen-
diary was a matter of interpretation of the facts. Certainly there was 
nothing about it which would have warranted suppression had not one or 
two of the auditors threatened violence. The police, without making any 
effort to control the crowd, arrested Feiner for disorderly conduct. 
Just w~at Chief Justice Vinson's Feiner opinion does to the law of this 
subject is not wholly clear; indeed, the last previous Supreme Court case 
on the point, then only two years old, is not mentioned.63 On the one hand 
the majority would not give "overzealous police officials complete discre-
tion to break up otherwise lawful meetings"; on the other, it would permit 
arrests where the speech is an "incitement to riot." How these areas are to 
be told apart is a mystery which the Chief Justice leaves to his successors. 
What has been said should not leave the impression that Vinson was a 
kind of upper-<:ase McCarthy. He was nothing of the sort. He had no free 
hand to make policy, and no one can know how heavily his innermost 
thoughts were moved by conceptions of the limited functions of the judi-
ciary. Moreover the trend of his opinions was not without exceptions: In 
Stack v. Boyle he blocked the practice of setting bail at impossible amounts 
so 331 u.s. 145, 157 (1947). 
151 For full analysis, see Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 25 Ind. 
L. J. 259 (1950). 
82 For discussion of the 19th and 20th Century experience, see Prohibition of Lawful As-
sembly When Opposed by Threat of Violence, 24 Ind. L. J. 78 (1949). 
63 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
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for citizens accused of offen..o:es as Commun.ists.64 He upheld the rights of 
Jehmrah's Witnesses to distribute their literature and to preach in public 
places."" He consistently pressed illinois, in particular, to adopt a fair 
post-conviction I'e\iew procedure." At his last term, in Brock t'. Xorth 
CtwoliM,'' he wrote a striking dissent protesting the Court's action in up-
holding a conviction of a man on his second trial after first trial had been 
halted by the state because it unexpectedly found that certain witnesses 
on whom it relied would not then give the testimony the state wanted. 
though there was reason to suppose that they would, as indeed they did, 
perform satisfactorily later. In a thoroughly researched opinion. rm_;;on 
strenuously condemned as double jeopardy the practice of permitting the 
state under any guise to give a case a preliminary run. find out its weak-
nesses, and then come back again to do better if it could. 
Even in the loyalty and legislative investigation area, there were limits 
to the Chief Justice's tolerance of contemporary practices. Of profound 
significance as the first ca.<:e in many years to limit legislative inquiries was 
~~niled Stalest'. Rumely,6; at the 1952 Term, an opinion by JUEtice Frank-
furter in which the Chief Justice joined. Rumely had refused to answer 
questions concerning who had bought certain large quantities of his publi-
cations, which were designed to be distributed to the general public in the 
hope that they in tum would influence Congressmen on particular legisla-
tion. The Committee asking the questions was, under its authorizing 
resolution, investigating "lobbying." If lobbying is any-thing more than 
buttonholing legislators in the Capitol corridors, then pretty clearly the 
term would include what Rumely did. Yet as a matter of Engfuh gram-
mar, the word cotdtJ be construed to exclude such secondary or large scale 
pressure activity. The Frankfurter opinion took the view teat. where dif-
ficult constitutional questions as to the scope of a Commiuee·s power are 
presented, the authorizing resolution is to be given the narrowest possible 
construction con..;;onant with English usage. \\1despread application of this 
principle may have great effect on many outstanding ca...<:es.~3 
"3l2 U.S. 1 £1951). Cf. for his different \iews on related bailproblemsoi aliens, Carlson v. 
Landoo, 3l2 'C".S. 52-l (1952). 
"!\"kmotko v.llaz}·Jand, 340 t".S. 268 (19.51); and he joined in the opinion of Justice 
Doo&):a.s in Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 t;".S. 67 (1953). But ci. Poulos v. Xew Hampshire, 
345 t:.S. 395 (1953), discussed in note 99 infra. 
•Jenninp Y • .IDmois, 3l2 U.S. 104 (19.51); see 1951 Term :article, pp. 4i-t9. 
n 31-l U.S. 424 (1953). A 34.5 t".S. -11 (1953). 
• Facts are unavailable for a serious estimate oi the effect, but the writer has a strong i:n-
pression that in recent years Congressional Committee!; of iiivesti.,aat!!l!! have ~ proceeding 
almost without rqard to the euct terms of their authorizing resolntions. 
HeinOnline  -- 21 U. Chi. L. Rev.  236 1953-1954
236 THE UNIVERSITY OF CIDCAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21 
But Vinson's largest a:ffinnative contribution to the law of civil rights 
was in connection with race relations. His restrictive covenant and segre-
gated law school opinions were discussed earlier. He wrote one of the opin-
ions in the case invalidating racial exclusion of Japanese from California 
land holding, and joined in the opinion invalidating restrictions on their 
fishing rights.70 • 
In the race relation cases generally, Vmson was a middle-of-the-roader, 
usually taking the position which would reach the immediate result and 
yet have the least effect on our peculiar institutions. In the Restrictive 
Covenant Cases, he was very careful to preserve the concept of "state 
. action" as a limitation on the Fourteenth Amendment, going almost 
gratuitously out of his way to reaffirm cases on that subject not immedi-
ately in issue.71 While he joined in the cases clearing up what remained of 
the "white primaries,"72 at the 1952 Term, he did not join Justices Black, 
Douglas, and Burton in taking the further position that the prohibition of 
the Fifteenth Amendment applies as much to state tolerance of discrimi-
natory voting practices as it does to affirmative discrimination by the 
state itsel£.73 His Texas law school segregation opinion was carefully lim-
ited to the actual facts of inequality; it went beyond the needs of the 
immediate situation in that it established factors of comparison which 
apply to graduate education generally, but it definitely refused to con-
sider the more basic question of the validity of segregation, assuming that 
under segregation there can ever be "equality" in fact.-
Hence there is no way of 'knowing how the Chief Justice would have 
voted in the grade school segregation cases if they had been decided. The 
somewhat technical nature of his approach to a~l of these cases made him 
capable of assuming even a lonely position in derogation of Negro rights. 
Thus at his last term he was the sole dissenter in a case holding that the 
rule of his restrictive covenant opinions applied to damages actions for 
selling to Negroes between white neighbors and a white vendor.74 The 
Restrictive Covenant Cases had held that the Negro could not be en-
joined from occupying land he had bought; if the white neighbor could 
collect darp.ages from the vendor on the transaction, the sale would be 
70 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., 334 U.S. 
410 (1948). 
71 "Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, the principle has become 
firmly imbedded in our constitutional law .•.. "etc. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
n Cf. Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949). 
73 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
74 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
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equally frustrated, this time because it would not be made. Yet on the 
ground that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment was not in-
tended for either of the immediate parties to the suit, Vinson was willing 
to nullify the result of his own leading opinion.75 
b) Econvmic problems.-The most paradoxical aspect of the Vmson 
record on the Court is that the former chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee, the former wartime director of economic affairs, the former 
head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the former Secretary of 
the Treasury made his judicial reputation largely in the field of civil lib-
erty. In matters of economic policy, there is no cluster of cases from which 
one can draw anything approaching a Vmson economic philosophy. 
The major anti-trust opinions of recent years were written by others. 
During thee years, anti-trust law stayed about where it was; there were 
no sensational advances. Since the trend to monopolization was mean-
while increasing in fact, 76 the main effect of the works of the Court in 
Vinson's years was that of standing by to let the economy go. 
To find any significance in the Vinson economic opinions broad enough 
to have any prospect of seeming still vital20 years from now, one is fairly 
well restricted to the United Mine Workers case, the steel setzure case, and 
the v.:ar-time demolition case already mentioned. Otherwise, one must 
reach for lesser matters, as for example his two excellent opinions invali-
dating state strike restrictions as encroachments on the right to strike as 
established in federallaw.77 
These latter opinions suggest that Vinson was not much worried about 
any abstract concept of "states' rights." He had been a national statesman 
too long to have any lingering sentimentality for state prerogatives out-
side their fair province; he would not strain to save a state law by any 
extreme effort to find that it did not conflict with a federal statute. Per-
haps a similar "nation first" spirit accounts for his adherence to the ma-
jority in the cases establishing (momentarily at least) national supremacy 
over the offshore oil. 78 If there is a single substantial instance in which 
71 The suit was between two parties to a restrictive covenant, the defendant having breached 
it by selling his property to a Negro. That sale was already completed, and would not be im-
mediately affected by the outcome of the action for damages. The Chief Justice said, "The 
plain, admitted fact that there is no identifiable non-Caucasian before this Court who will be 
denied any right to buy, occupy or otherwise enjoy the properties involved ••• is decisive for 
me." Ibid., at 262. 
71 See Mund, Government and Business (1950), passim; but cf. for another view Adelman, 
33 Rev. Econ. Statistics 269 (1951). 
77 Int. Union, UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Bd., 
340 u.s. 383 (1951). 
11 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 
(1950). 
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Vinson ever' drew back from an eXpansion of federal power at state ex-
pense, it is not now recalled. Hence he went along with the majority opin-
ion at the 1952 Term upholding the validity of the federal tax on persons 
engaged in gambling. The object was obviously to suppress a vice which 
would normally be regarded as a matter of state concern; but, said the 
Court, "As is well known, the constitutional restraints on taxing are 
few.m9 
One large direct consequence of Vinson's succession to the Bench in-
volved this area of state-federal supremacy. He brought to the Court an 
attitude, more important than any single decision, of great hostility toward 
any state burdens on commerce. Doctrine immediately before his time had 
been largely developed by Chief Justice Stolle with considerable leniency 
toward state regulation and taxation and toward the development of a 
practical, rather than a verbal, solution of these difficult problems. 80 In 
this area, Vmson did not take the middle position; he was unwilling to 
allow taxes or regulations burdening commerce without elaborate con-
siderations of "multiple burdens," weighing of local advantage against 
national needs, and the like. 81 His views sufficiently changed the balance 
of power as to state regulations that the Stone views are fighting for their 
lives;82 and in Vmso~'s first term, in the tax field, the Stone approach was 
largely abandoned. 83 
c) Other f!Hllters. -A gr~t many of Vinson's opinions were on procedure 
and jurisdiction. They did not happen to cluster around particular sub-
jects sufficiently to permit of any rational integration by way of review. 
This is regrettable because here is some of his finest work. Which is out-
standing is of course a matter of taste; this writ~r particularly admires his 
dissent on the issue of the validity of the statute permitting District of 
Columbia residents to sue in diversity.84 
One Vinson opinion of major importance remains: Sherrer v. Sherrer is a 
11 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953). 
1° See Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution, 46 Col. L. Rev. 764, 785 et seq. (1946). 
81 See Independent Warehouses v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70, Jackson-Vmson opinion at 91 
(1947); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 645 (1951) (dissent); cf. Norton Co. v. Dept. of 
Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951). 
12 See Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 {1949). The possible continued vitality of the 
Stone approach is not yet settled; of the new appointees, Justice Clark in particular ap-
proaches the cases much as Stone did, and has written several times in the field. See his Cities 
Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas" Co., 340 U.S. 179 {1950); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 
340 U.S. 349 {1951); and his dissent in Spector Motor Service Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 
610 (1951). 
13 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 {1946); see also the Spector case, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). 
u National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 626 (1949). 
HeinOnline  -- 21 U. Chi. L. Rev.  239 1953-1954
1954] VINSON AND THE CITIEF JUSTICESITIP 239 
major contribution to the solution of the quickie divorce problem.85 Prior 
to Sherrer and its companion case the situation had been badly confused, 
leading to Justice Jackson's very pertinent observation, "If there is one 
thing that the people are entitled to expect from their lawmakers, it is 
rules of law that will enable individuals to tell whether they are married, 
and, if so, to whom."86 Sherrer gave the needed clarification. The second 
Williams cas.e had established that Florida and Nevada divorces based on 
constructive service are no better than the other states want to make 
them;87 now it was established that divorces in those or other quickie 
states based on actual service and actual participation are fool-proof. The 
practical effect of Sherrer is to give legal recognition and accommodation 
to the observable fact that divorce in the United States is usually about as 
much a consensual status, depending upon agreement among the parties, 
as is marriage, at least for those who can afford a trip. 88 
ill. APPRAISAL 
John Marshall served 35 years, Taney almost 30, Stone 20 counting 
both of his positions. Fred Vmson was a member of the Supreme Court for 
sev~n years. This can be long enough to leave a heavy impress; Justice 
Fran~urter has thought Justice Moody, who served only four years, one 
of the great figures of our judicial history;89 and others consider Justice 
Curtis {1851-57) as a power on the Bench. 
But in terms of any likely expectancy, seven years is not enough for real 
opportunity. It is little more than one Senate term, a sort of judicial 
novitiate. Appraisal, then, must be a conscious viewing of a fragment. 
Perhaps a longer tenure would have told a different story; certainly it 
would have told more of a story. 
For example, in the field of judicial administration one knows almost 
nothing about this Chief Justice. The volume of actual decided cases, with 
written opinions, declined almost constantly throughout these years, 
reaching a point in 1951 and 1952 which pulled the volume of the Court's 
business to its lowest level in a century.90 Some critics have thought that 
u 334 U.S. 343 (1948). as Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). 
87 Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945). 
88 Professor Fowler Harper, editor of Problems in Family Law (1952), advises that, on the 
basis of numerous interviews with divorce practitioners, the general run of problems on 
foreign divorces seems well settled since Sherrer. The rare and intricate problem may still re-
main; cf. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952). 
81 Cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947). 
90 The pre-war volume was around 200 cases a year. In Vinson's years the numbers were: 
1946, 142; 1947, 119; 1948, 122; 1949, 94; 1950, 88; 1951, 89; 1952, 104. On the counting 
method, see note 18, supra. 
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the Court is turning away too much business with 'its use of its certiorari 
discretion;91 be that as it may, the end result is that there was no great 
bulk of business to administer. Some of the Vinson terms were longer than 
might have been thought to be necessary for this volume of business, and 
on occasion what seemed an abnormally large number of cases were car-
ried over for reargument;92 but all this is not very significant at most. 
Putting together all the odds and ends of facts and rumor concerning ad-
ministration, the most that one can say with assurance is that Charles 
Evans Hughes' reputation as the top administrator of the Court in the 
20th Century was not seriously menaced by Fred M. Vmson. 
The most peculiar reargument episode of Vmson's Chief-Justiceship 
was undoubtedly the series of orders concerning the grade school segrega-
tion cases. The South Carolina school case, Briggs v. Elliott, v3 was in the 
Court at the beginning of the term in the fall of 1951. The Court held 
Briggs for six months-and then remanded it for what appeared to be al-
most superfluous proceedings below. The case duly came back again in the 
fall of 1952 quite unaffected by the required lower court proceedings, and 
was postponed again until December, 1952-which is to say, until after 
the election. It was then argued most elaborately by very distinguished 
counsel. In June, 1953, reargument was ordered for the fall of 1953, and 
the matter was subsequently postponed until December, 1953. It will 
presumably be argued in 1953 and, perhaps, decided then. V( The case is 
91 That has been the theme of this series of articles; see particularly 1950Term, pp. 216-17, 
231-34. For more comprehensive discussion see the annual series of Professor Harper and col-
laborators beginning in 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 293 (1950). 
n Four cases were carried over for reargument from the 1951 to the 1952 Term: United 
States ex rei. Smith v. Baldi, decided at 344 U.S. 561 (1953); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 
344 U.S. 94 (1952); United States v. Henning, 344 U.S. 66 (1952); and the Brown v. Allen 
group, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); and meanwhile the segregation cases were being carried along, see 
next note and text. In addition to the school cases, a group of Labor Board cases was carried for 
re-argument from the 1952 to the 1953 Term, Radio Officers v. NLRB, No.5 at the October, 
1953 Term, as was Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, No. 11 at the October, 1953 Term. 
93 342 U.S. 350 (1952), Justices Black and Douglas dissenting. 
94 Briggs v. Elliott was docketed in the fall of 1951 and remanded on January 28, 1952, . 
342 U.S. 350. It duly returned and jurisdiction was noted on June 9, 1952. Meanwhile the 
appeal in Brown v. Topeka was filed in November, 1951, and no action was taken until prob-
able jurisdiction was noted along with Briggs v. Elliott on June 9th. On Oct. 8, 1952, probable 
jurisdiction was noted in Davis v. County School Board, 344 U.S. 1, and at the same time an 
order was issued postponing argumen~ in the first two cases from the scheduled date of October 
13th to a date in December, by which time it was anticipated that a fourth case, Bolling v. 
Sharpe, would be ready to be included; and certiorari was granted in the Bolling case, on Nov. 
10, 1952, 344 U.S. 873. But before the December argument still another case had turned up, 
Gebhart v. Belton, cert. granted November 24, 1952, 344 U.S. 891. 
Mter elaborate argument, the whole group was then set for reargument by order of June 8, 
1953, with certain specific questions listed for discussion, the reargument to be October 12 
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thus well on its way to the category of the great delayed decisions, like 
the Charles River Bridge Case (six yeats), or the Lottery cases (three 
years). As with those cases, the special tension attached to the matter 
takes it out of the category of normal administrative questions. 
In two aspects of administration, Vinson was highly successful. His 
assignment of opinions was extremely fair; since as was shown earlier, he 
often skimped himself, it was fair to the point of leaning over backwards. 
There has been no hazing period of dull statutory and tax cases for the 
younger Justices, no playing of favorites. The plums-the big and the in-
teresting cases-were, within the limits of agreement, fairly passed around. 
Also, his work with the Judicial Conference, in which he took great inter-
est, was well done and fruitful. He helped to develop the status of the 
Conference, backed its legislation, and took enormous pride in its ac-
complishments. 95 
If there is a common impression that Vinson inherited a quarrelsome 
and divided Court and somehow welded it into an harmonious whole, the 
impression is pretty clearly wrong. It is based largely on the unusual out-
break by Justice Jackson against Justice Black immediately subsequent to 
Vinson's selection as Chief Justice. Justice Black bore the attack in total 
silence, and Justice Jackson never repeated it after his return from N urem-
berg. There is no reason whatsoever to suppose that the proper silence of 
the one Justice and the belated silence of the other were the result of any 
effort of the Chief Justice.96 
The Chief Justice undoubtedly did his best to reduce what has seemed 
to many the excess of dissents and concurrences; he very rarely accom-
plished either. But the will of one man, Chief Justice or not, is not enough 
to have any great effect as to dissents. The bulk of his own outstanding 
opinions were for a less than unanimous Court, and in a surprisingly large 
number, he did not unequivocally speak for five Justices. In United Mine 
Workers, two others subscribed in full to his opinion, in Douds three, in 
1953, 345 U.S. 972; and subsequently the time for filing briefs was extended to December, 1953. 
For some discussion of the political aspects of these postponements, see Frank, Can Courts 
Erase the Color Line, 2 Buff. L. Rev. 28, 37 (1952). 
The Court also permitted two related cases to remain on its docket without acting on the 
petitions for certiorari. In Holcombe v. Beal, involving the right of Negroes to use the munici-
pal pool the petition had been filed in June during the last week of the 1951-52 Term; Hawkins 
v. Florida, a graduate school segregation case, was filed in late October. 
"A good expression of this attitude is United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952), in-
volving a challenge to the validity of a bit of legislation which had originated with the Judicial 
Council. 
"For fuller discussion see Frank, Mr. Justice Black, chap. VII (1949). 
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Dennis three, in Burns three, in Oyama two, and in the steel seizure case 
he dissented for two others. Of his greatest opinions, only the Restrictive 
Covenant and law school segregation cases approximated unanimity.97 
But while Vinson's exact doctrines were not often unequivocally ac-
cepted, his views as to results usually prevailed. He was almost invariably 
in the majority. The figures for the most important cases of the 1952 
Term are printed here to complete the data for previous terms, but this 
one year's figures are a little misleading. Putting together all of the im-
portant cases of the past seven years, Vmson was in the majority slightly 
more often than any other Justice. 
TABLE 3 
VOTING DISTRffiUTION IN MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES11 
1952TERM 






Vmson ........ 6 27 33 1 6 7 
Black ......... 3 16 19 4 15 19 
Reed .......... 6 32 38 0 1 1 
Frankfurter .... 4 24 28 3 7 10 
Douglas ....... 3 15 18 4 17 21 
JackSon ....... 6 30 36 1 5 6 
Burton ........ 6 28 34 0 3 3 
Clark ......... 7 27 34 0 2 2 
Minton ........ 5 30 35 1 3 4 
97 These cases are each cited supra in connection with their substantive discussion. 
The factual basis is not apparent for such common newspaper assertions as the Washington 
Star's, "Chief Justice Vmson was credited with substantial progress in trying to reconcile dif-
ferences or prevent public signs of bickering on the bench." Washington Evening Star, p. A-6 
(Sept. 8, 1953). Max Lerner, N.Y. Post, p. 30 (Sept. 9, 1953), credits Vmson with trying "to cut 
down judicial wrangles," saying, ''He tried very hard to get his associates to stop writing so 
many dissenting and concurring opinions." Again, no evidence is cited. This is not to say that 
these observations may not have been true, but merely that no outsider could know about 
them from any published source. My suspicion is that this is one of those amiable falsehoods 
ordained to become legend. 
It is true that Vmson's own manner, as exhibited to outsiders at least, was always affable 
toward his brethren. A rare exception at the 1947 Term, headlined by the Louisville Courier 
Journal, Apr. 30, 1948, ''Vinson Hushes Up Frankfurter in Unusual Supreme Court Flare-
Up," was certainly a trifling instance. For details see 16 LW 3329 (1948). 
A good indication of Vmson's temperate manner is the steel seizure dissent, in which Vinson 
may well have felt stronger, and hence have been more tempted to excess, than in any other 
opinion. Justices Jackson and Clark as Attorneys General and steel company counsel John 
W. Davis as Solicitor General had each taken previous positions which a reasonable man 
might have thought in conflict with their positions in this case. Vmson squeezed the last juice 
from these incongruities without being in any way offensive or personal. 
18 Cases listed as major are United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952), the war damage 
liability case discussed above; United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), the gambling tax 
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The most important conclusion, of course, defies numerical analysis. 
Was Vinson as to his colleagues of the majority a leader, a follower, a co-
worker, or some of each? No one outside the Court can know, and guess 
work would be profitless. The Justices with whom Vmson most completely 
agreed were his three fellow Truman appointees, Burton, Clark, and 
Minton, but above all, Reed. Jackson commonly came to the same results 
as Vinson, but very often in quite different ways. Of the basic "Vinson 
bloc" of Reed, Burton, Clark, and Minton, the bulk of the most important 
opinions were written by Reed, as befitted his seniority and ability. This 
was particularly noticeable in Vmson's last year on the Bench when Reed, 
at the height of his powers, had an outstanding year.99 Figures on agree-
case discussed above; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953), the decision closely confin-
ing Congressional Committees within the scope of their authorizing resolutions; Terry v. 
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the decision on a Texas variant of the white primary, which draws 
its special significance from the fact that three Justices repudiated the "state action" limita-
tion on the Fifteenth Amendment; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), the damages case 
on restrictive covenants; Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), the case on civil review of 
military courts discussed above; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), a basic confession 
case. 
Cases listed as important are Federal Power Comm. v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952); 
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174; 
Wiemin v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183; United States v. C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952); 
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); 
King v. United States, 344 U.S. 254 (1952); American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 
U.S. 298 {1953); Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953); FTC v. Motion Picture Co., 
344 U.S. 392 (1953); NLRB v. Dant, 344 U.S. 375 (1953); Bro\\"D v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); 
Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953); Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583 (1953); Chew v. 
Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); American Newsp. Pub. Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); 
NLRB v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U.S. 117 (1953); Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examin-
ers, 345 U.S. 128 (1953);Local Union v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953);Heikkila v. Barber, 345 
U.S. 229 (1953); United States ex rei. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm., 345 U.S. 153 (1953); 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rei. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 
345 U.S. 330 (1953); United States v. PUC, 345 U.S. 295 (1953); Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 
U.S. 322 (1953); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. 
Evans, 345 U.S. 495/(1953); Tl!Des-Picayune Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); 
·Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); 
United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953); District of Columbia v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 
100 (1953). 
99 Important Reed opinions were United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), the 
gambler's tax case; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), on a difficult prob-
lem of separation of church and state; American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 
(1952), an important Interstate Commerce Commission case; NLRB v. Dant, 344 U.S. 375 
(1953), on a very important detail of the timing of filing non-Communist affidavits in Labor 
Board matters; Bro\\"Il v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), involving several matters of fair trial and 
the effect of the denial of the writ of certiorari in these cases; United States v. Public Utilities 
Comm., 345 U.S. 295 (1953), on the coverage of the Federal Power Act; Dameron v. Brod-
head, 345 t'.S. 322 (1953), on validity of exemption of soldiers' property from tax; Poulos v. 
New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), on the extent to which an applicant for street use for 
religious purposes must exhaust his state remedies; Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 
495 (1953), a sovereign immunity problem; Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), on 
the scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act as applied to the Texas City disaster of 1947. In 
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ments follow. Whether Reed's role in getting to the results was as great as 
his role in expressing them cannot be known. 
There is a needful lesson to be learned from the career of Vinson as Chief 
Justice. It is perfectly apparent that Vinson was not the success in the 
Chief Justiceship that he was in some of his other offices. Those who ob-
served him as Director of the Office of Economic Stabilization report him 
at his best, and it was a great best. In that Office he showed a capacity to 
master large areas of factual information quickly, to adjust differences of 
opinion, to be decisive and yet conciliatory, and above all else to originate 
action programs. Reasonable and patriotic public servants might disagree 
with his action, just as reasonable men might later differ with his opinions, 
but he did act. 
Yet in all this, in his other administrative, and in his legislative work, 
he had staff to assist, to do the writing, the drafting, the detail work. What 
was reserved for him was usually the ultimate Yes or No, or the task of 
negotiating to some ultimate Yes or No. This capacity to decide and to 
other words, of the forty most important cases of the year, Reed wrote the opinion in about 
twenty-five per cent. 
Most of these opinions were extremely successful. The Dant and Standard Oil cases are 
very clear and compelling. The Kedroff case called for abundant reference to material on church 
history; a comprehensive check of the footnotes shows the material all much in point. 
Since Reed to so large an extent was, author-wise, "the Vinson Court," it may be appro-
priate to note a few dissatisfactions as well. Brown v. Allen, so far as Reed's opinion is con-
cerned, was a dissent on the issue of the effect cf denial of certiorari; many re-readings leave 
simply incomprehensible just what weight Justice Reed thought should be given by the 
District Court to the denial. Kahriger really attempts no distinction of the Child Labor Tax 
case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922), which is thrust aside in a sentence and a footnote-perhaps no more 
than can be done without overruling it. 
The prose of the introduction and first part of the Poulos case has an unusually lumpy, 
parenthetical quality making for poor understanding on a first reading. Moreover, as a result 
of this decision a speaker deprived of a license arbitrarily must go to court to vindicate his 
rights before speaking as if he had wished to "erect structures, purchase firearms ••• ," etc. 
345 U.S. 395, 409. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, urging that speech deserves special 
protectio_n. 'Black declared that "This to me is a subtle use of a creeping censorship loose in the 
land." 345 U.S. 395, 422. 
In the Texas City disaster case, the issue was whether the government could be held liable 
under the Tort Claims Act for the explosion of government manufactured and exported 
fertilizer. The defense was that the government's act was not "mere negligence." Rather, 
if negligence at al~ it was negligence raised to the high level of "discretion," since the real 
negligence, if any, was in undertaking to manufacture so explosive a fertilizer in the first place. 
The line between the two is blurred by the Tort Claims Act itself; but Justice Reed's exemption 
of this series of events from liability because "discretionary" seems so all inclusive that it 
would also exempt the consequences i( an agency head told his truckers to d!jve fast or if an 
army general deliberately, though needlessly, sent his airplanes low over a city. Justice Reed 
puts it thus broadly: "Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. 
It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in 
accordance with official directions cannot be actionable." 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953). It seems al-
most inevitable that this language will some day have to be modified; it certainly went beyond 
the exact needs of this case. 
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decide wisely, is only one of several required of a Supreme Court Justice. 
The qualities of a great Justice include wisdom, but in addition they in-
clude knowledge, skill, and diligence in some combination. Vinson's 
career developed wisdom; it did not develop in equal degree the kinds of 
skill and knowledge of a Taney or a Taft. 
Vinson's career epitomizes one of the great problems in the selection of a 
modern Supreme Court Justice, one for which there is no ready answer. 
Our Justices commonly come from the figures of public life, from the 
Cabinet or the Congress. The complexities of modern life now require that 
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work except decision making. The jobs are too big to leave details to the 
leaders. If Franklin D. Roosevelt had spent as much time on his state 
papers as Abraham Lincoln spent on his, he would have had no time left 
to direct World War II. A Senator from a large state in particular can 
seldom, if ever, be a Clay or a Webster; he must be the head of an office. 
We live in an age of the staff researcher, the ghost writer, the first draft 
man; they are imperative for most important public figures. And so we 
develop a breed of public man who works that way.101 But the business of 
the Supreme Court has not gained in either complexity or volume in any 
thing like the complexity and volume of the remainder of public affairs. 
1oo These are the cases cited in Note 98, supra. 
101 See, e.g., the episode concerning Interior Secretary McKay and his testimony before a 
House Committee on May 6, 1953, as reported N.Y. Times, p. 12 (May 7, 1953). Mcl):ay testi-
fied that certain unspecified personnel changes had been made in the Tariff Commission, as a 
result of which a given policy should be followed. Rep. Eberharter interrupted to ask what the 
changes were. Said McKay, "I must admit I don't know. I thought it had changed. I didn't 
write this particular paragraph. I suppose it had changed." Replied Mr. Eberharter, courteous-
ly taking the Secretary's bobble in stride, "The person who wrote your statement must have 
meant that the Commission had a new member." McKay, "I suppose so." 
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Perhaps it should; but the fact is as noted a moment ago, the volume of 
Supreme Court business of late is around the Ciyil War level; and the in~ . 
crease in complexity, while great, is not overwhelming.102 
In short, our society is filling the familiar reservoir of public officials 
from which we draw Supreme Court appointees with men who are 
equipped to handle broad responsibilities better than even great details; 
they are not quite cut out for the judicial job. Such men, when they trans-
fer to the judiciary, may try to carry their institutional pattern with 
them; Vinson, as has been noted, turned the once lonely job of Chief 
Justice of the United States into a staff operation. Yet such a transfer can 
never be a complete success. Vinson, without doubt, was responsible for 
every vote he ever cast, for every Yes or No; but a judicial opinion is a 
mass of subordinate decisions, and nothing in the exigencies of the office 
require that these be left to subordinates to make. 
In his total impact on American law,-Vinson will probably be remem-
bered as the symbol of the judicial age which reversed the trend of the 
Hughes-Stone periods toward judicially .enfo.rced civil liberty. Civil liberty 
doctrine had developed between 1918 and 1930 in the dissents of Holmes 
and Brandeis. The replacement of Chief J~stice Taft and Associate Jus-
tice Sanford by Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts in 1930-31 car-
ried the Holmes-Brandeis spirit into the majority even before the New 
Deal appointments,1°3 and, thereafter expanded upon it in a dozen new 
ways. This new era of judicial liberty winked out during Vinson's Chief 
Justiceship; the spirit of Taft and Sanford is in effect renewed again, with 
Black and Douglas as the principal dissenters. Vinson will be remembered 
as the Chief who presided at the liquidation of the new liberalism in juris-
prudence. 
He will also be remembered as a friendly, unassuming man who loved 
his country ahead of any personal or provincial interest; who relinquished 
security and comfort to serve it well in its wartime need; who, if he ever 
erred in his judgments, erred in the direction he thought his country's 
safety required. And he will be remembered as a Judge who, in two great 
opinions, did much to break the grasp of racial prejudice in the land. 
102 For a synopsis of this development, see FJ!IDk.furter and Landis, The Business of the 
Supreme Court, chap. 8 (1927). 
1oa See, for examples, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and Herndon v. Lowry, 301 
U.S. 242 (1937) on free speech; Brown v. Mis5issippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), on forced confes-
sions; and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), on the right to counsel. 
